





This paper studies how implicit collusion may take place in non-
exclusive contracting under adverse selection when multiple agents
(e.g., entrepreneurs with risky projects) non-exclusively trade with
multiple rms (e.g., banks). It shows that any price schedule can be
supported as equilibrium terms of trade in the market if each rm's
expected prot is no less than its reservation prot. Firms sustain
collusive outcomes through the triggering trading mechanism in which
they change their terms of trade contingent only on agents' reports on
the lowest average price that the deviating rm's trading mechanism
would induce.
1 Introduction
Trading in decentralized markets is frequently non-exclusive by nature and
involves asymmetric information between contracting parties. For example, a
bank may lend money to many entrepreneurs who have private information
on their risky projects and vice versa an entrepreneur may borrow money
from many banks to nance his risky project. Various nancial assets in-
cluding derivatives are also non-exclusively traded among sellers and buyers.
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1Some traders tend to have more information on the underlying values of
structured assets such as derivatives than others do.
Non-exclusive contracting with multiple agents (e.g., entrepreneurs in
loan contracting) is generally a complex process for rms (e.g., banks in
loan contracting) because agents can also contract with competing rms. In
this contracting environment, agents may well communicate with rms at
the contracting stage because rms can ask agents about competing rms'
terms of trade (e.g. loan amount and interest pairs in loan contracting). Im-
portantly, when multiple agents communicate with rms, rms can compare
what agents are telling. This may make it easier for rms to acquire the true
information on competing rms' terms of trade from multiple agents. Subse-
quently, they may want to oer trading mechanisms in which their terms of
trade depend on agents' reports on competing rms' terms of trade. In this
way, rms can actively punish a deviating rm by changing their terms of
trade upon agents' reports on the deviating rm's terms of trade and hence
they may sustain many collusive outcomes that are not possible when there
is only one agent.
The idea of collusion through complex communication mechanisms is in
fact the central theme that motivates the literature on competing mecha-
nism design. Epstein and Peters (1999) construct a very rich language that
agents can use in describing the market information when they communicate
with rms. Peters and Szentes (2012) characterize equilibrium allocations
and equilibrium contracts when a rm has unlimited commitment in the
sense that it can make its contract directly contingent on the other rms'
contracts.1
Yamashita (2010) considers the competing mechanism game in Epstein
and Peters (1999) where the rm has limited commitment so that it can make
its contract contingent on agents' messages only. He then shows that rms
can sustain various collusive outcomes if each rm oers the recommendation
mechanism that asks each agent to report his type and the direct mechanism
the rm should choose. When all agents report the same direct mechanism,
the rm chooses that direct mechanism, which then determines the rm's
decision according to agents' type reports. His approach tells us how one
can view rms' implicit collusion via their commitment to the recommen-
1There are no distinction between principals and agents in Peters and Szentes (2012)
and Peters and Troncoso Valverde (2010) because (i) all players can oer mechanisms to
other players and hence (ii) all players communicate with one another.
2dation mechanisms but it does not identify equilibrium allocations because,
in his approach, equilibrium allocations are specied by the rm's minmax
value relative to the set of all complex mechanisms but it is not feasible to
specify the exact set of all complex mechanisms. For the characterization
of equilibrium allocations, Peters and Troncoso Valverde (2010) incorporate
two rounds of communication into Yamashita's recommendation mechanism.
The recommendation mechanism needs at least three or more agents for
their truthful reports but it provides a perfectly nice way of understanding
implicit collusion in general. Each agent's message in the recommendation
mechanism is simpler than the message in the universal language (Epstein
and Peters 1999). However, the message in the recommendation mechanism
is still complex and in particular it becomes increasingly complicated as the
number of agents increases. The reason is that each agent must report the en-
tire mapping of a direct mechanism that species an action for every possible
prole of all agents' types and hence each agent's burden of communication
exponentially increases in the number of agents.
The simplicity of an agent's message however seems important to under-
stand implicit collusion in some applications such as non-exclusive trading
problems mentioned earlier. For example, it is hard to imagine that a bank
asks each entrepreneur to report the bank's entire lending plan that specify
loan contracts for all entrepreneurs contingent on every feasible prole of
their project types. The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple equi-
librium mechanism that can minimize the agent's communication burden,
for a better understanding of implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting
under adverse selection such as investment nancing, insurance, and various
other trading problems. The key to such a simple mechanism is that each
agent's message should not depend on the number of agents nor does it take
a complex form.
Consider a market for a good where each privately-informed agent can
trade with any number of rms and each rm can also trade with any num-
ber of privately-informed agents. Firms can freely oer any arbitrary trading
mechanism that make quantity and monetary payment pairs across agents
contingent on their messages. The market terms of trade can be character-
ized by a price schedule that specify monetary payment from the agent as a
function of the quantity that the agent trades. The key result of the paper is
to show how to construct an equilibrium trading mechanism for rms, given
their implicit agreement on a price schedule, in a way that no rm gains by
deviating to any arbitrary complex trading mechanism. Then, we show that
3any price schedule can be supported as equilibrium terms of trade in the
market as long as it ensures that each rm receives no less prot than its
reservation prot.
This paper proposes the triggering weakly incentive compatible extended
(WICE) direct mechanism with which rms can maintain their implicit agree-
ment on a price schedule, say ~ y. A triggering WICE direct mechanism asks
each agent to report, along with the quantity that he wants to trade with the
rm, whether there is a deviating rm and, if so, what would be the deviating
rm's lowest average price that he believes he would face if he was the only
one who traded with the deviating rm. When agents are anonymous so that
the trading mechanism is anonymous, each agent has the same belief on the
lowest average price that the deviating rm's trading mechanism would in-
duce when he would be the only one who participated in the deviating rm's
trading mechanism. As shown later, this approach is easily extended to the
case in which agents are ex-ante heterogeneous.
The triggering WICE direct mechanism has the following structure. When
two or more agents participate in a rm's triggering WICE direct mechanism,
and more than half of their reports on the deviating rm's lowest average
price are all p, then the rm oers a linear price schedule such that its unit
price matches the minimum between p and the lowest average price of ~ y;
which is a price schedule rms implicitly agree on. In all other cases, the
rm continues to oer ~ y.
Suppose that some rm indeed deviates to an arbitrary mechanism and
each agent reports his true belief p to non-deviating rms. Then, each non-
deviating rm's price schedule is the linear price schedule in which the unit
price matches the minimum between p and the lowest average price of ~ y.
When there are three or more agents, one agent cannot unilaterally change
the non-deviating rm's price schedule given the other agents' truthful re-
ports, p: When there are only two agents, one agent can unilaterally change
the non-deviating rm's price schedule by reporting p0 (6= p) given the other
agent's truthful report, p. In this case, the triggering WICE direct mecha-
nism shoot them both by continuing to oer ~ y to them. It not only makes
each agent truthfully report p to each non-deviating rm given that the other
agents do the same: It also makes it optimal for each agent to trade only
with non-deviating rms. Consequently, a deviating rm ends up with its
reservation prot upon any deviation to any arbitrary mechanism because
no agents trade with the deviating rm in truthful continuation equilibrium.
When no rm deviates, each agent truthfully reports each rm, along with
4the quantity that he wants to trade with each rm, that no rm has deviated
and then each rm continues to oer ~ y. Because all agents report that no rm
has deviated, each rm also continues to oer ~ y upon any agent's unilateral
deviation to an alternative message and hence no agent has an incentive to
tell a lie. As long as a price schedule ensure that each rm receives no less
prot than its reservation prot, no rm has an incentive to deviate to any
arbitrary trading mechanism because it only receives its reservation payo
upon deviation to any trading mechanism.
The triggering WICE direct mechanism features convenience in a large
class of applications. Because each agent's message is simply two numbers
(the deviating principal's lowest average price and the quantity that the agent
wants to buy), it is simple and independent of the number of agents. Finally,
it also works for any multiple number of agents, including the case of two
agents, and the set of equilibrium payos is dened in terms of each rm's
reservation prot which is independent of trading mechanisms.
2 Literature Review
In common agency (multiple rms and a single agent), Pavan and Calzolari
(2009, 2010) propose a tractable class of extended direct mechanisms that
can be used in deriving an equilibrium relative to any complex mechanisms or
equivalently menus (Peters 2001 and Martimort and Stole 2002). They show
that a rm can ask the agent about his choice of payo-relevant alternatives
from all the other rms, along with his type. The agent's communication is
simpler than the communication with the universal language (Epstein and
Peters 1999) or the communication in the recommendation mechanism (Ya-
mashita 2010). However, it is not obvious how to extend Pavan and Calzo-
lari's approach to multiple agency (i.e., multiple rms and multiple agents).
Our paper shows that a single number, i.e., the deviating rm's lowest aver-
age price, becomes a sucient statistic for the market information in a large
class of applications for multiple agency. This enables us to view rms' im-
plicit collusion under adverse selection through the triggering WICE direct
mechanism in which the agent's communication is even simpler than what is
required in Pavan and Calzolari's extended direct mechanism.
In terms of applications, our paper allows for the common-value case
(the agent's type aects the principal's payo) as well as the private value
case (the agent's payo does not aect the principal's payo). An adverse
5selection problem, known as the lemon's problem in the common-value case,
was identied as early as Akerlof's seminal paper (1970) but he identied
the lemon's problem with as hoc restrictions such as price-taking behavior
and exclusive trading. Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976) considered strategic
contracting for the common-value case with multiple rms and a single agent
but trading is exclusive in the sense that an agent trades with only one rm.
They showed that the lemon's problem may be less severe in their screening
model. However, equilibrium may not exist.
Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988) show that when insurance rms directly
disclose and share information on who accepts the insurance contract in
non-exclusive contracting, the non-existence problem of equilibrium in the
common-value case under exclusive contracting can be resolved. Pouyet,
Salani e, and Salani e (2008) show that the adverse selection problem does
not occur and eciency is achieved in the private-value case even with the
restriction of exclusive trading.
Recently Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011) relax the restriction of ex-
clusive trading to examine whether the lemon's problem is still present in the
strategic model of non-exclusive trading for the common-value case where a
single seller who is privately-informed about the quality of her product can
sell it to multiple buyers.2 They extend the results to bilateral contracting
in which each buyer oers a menu of quantity and price pairs to each seller.3
They show that the lemon's problem is the necessary equilibrium feature
even in bilateral contracting in the sense that equilibrium aggregate alloca-
tion in bilateral contracting is unique, and the equilibrium price of the good
is always equal to the expected quality of the good traded in the market, and
a seller with a good of quality higher than the equilibrium price stays out of
the market.
Our paper studies equilibrium allocation and trading mechanism in the
fully generalized contracting environment where each rm's terms of trade
2A buyer is the contracting party who oers a trading mechanism so he is equivalent to
a rm in our paper or a principal in general. A seller is the contracting party who sends
a report to buyers given trading mechanisms so she is equivalent to an agent in our paper
or an agent in general.
3Prat and Rustichini (2003) extend non-exclusive trading to bilateral contracting in
which multiple principals negotiate terms of trades with multiple agents independently.
However, agents have no private information in Prat and Rustichini's model. Han (2006)
shows why principals can rely on menus instead of complex mechanisms in bilateral con-
tracting.
6for an agent can be determined based on communication with all agents.
The results in our paper imply that, in the general contracting environment,
any price schedule and the associated allocation can be supported in equilib-
rium as long as they provide each rm with expected prot no less than its
reservation prot. Therefore, the lemon's problem in the unique equilibrium
allocation of bilateral contracting is no longer the necessary equilibrium fea-
ture in the general contracting environment. Combining the results in Attar,
Mariotti, and Salani e (2011), it suggests that the lemon's problem can be the
necessary equilibrium feature with contractual restrictions such as bilateral
contracting but it arises as a coordination failure in the general contracting
environment without contractual restrictions.
Ales and Maziero (2009) derive a similar result for the common-value
case to the one in Attar, Mariotti, and Salani e (2011). Finally, Biais, Marti-
mort, and Rochet (2000) study non-exclusive nancial asset trading for the
common-value case in a common agency framework. In their model, multi-
ple market makers compete in price schedules to supply liquidity to a single
agent who is privately informed about the value of the asset and his hedging
needs. With a continuum of the agent's types, they show that there exists
a unique equilibrium in convex price schedules, which leads to Cournot-type
equilibrium outcomes in the sense that each market maker makes positive
expected prots but these prots go away as the number of market makers
increases.
3 Model
Suppose that I ex-ante anonymous agents (I  2) trade with J rms (J  2)
in a market for a good. Each agent can trade a good with any number of
rms and each rm can also trade with any number of agents. Let x
j
i denote
the quantity of the good that agent i buys from rm j: If x
j
i > 0; then agent i
is the buyer and rm j is the seller between the two; If x
j
i < 0; then rm j is
the buyer and agent i is the seller. Let X  R be the set of feasible quantities
that each agent i buys from each rm j. Let m
j
i be the monetary payment




i > 0 if x
j
i 6= 0: It means that the
buyer who buys the good pays a positive amount of money to the seller and






i) 2 X  R
be the pair of the total quantity that agent i trades with rms and the total
monetary payment that he makes to rms. Let !i denote agent i's payo
7type, which is assumed to be agent i's own private information. Let 
 be
the set of all feasible payo types for each agent. When agent i of type !i
trades the total quantity xi at the total payment mi; his utility is
u(xi;mi;!i):
We assume that u(xi;mi;!i) is decreasing in mi at each (xi;!i): Each rm














at each ! = [!1;:::;!I]. Note that the formulation of each rm j's prot
function allows for the common value of each agent i's type as well as the
private value.
A seller trades with multiple buyers and a buyer also trades with multiple
sellers in a variety of settings. The examples for the common-value case
includes investment nancing, insurance, and trading goods or services:
Investment Financing: Entrepreneur i has a risky investment project. It
generates prot f(xi) when the amount of money invested in the project
is xi. Let x
j
i be the amount of money borrowed from lender j and m
j
i the
amount of money that the entrepreneur agrees to pay back when the project
turns out to be successful. Let !i be the probability of success. Let 
be the risk-free (gross) interest rate. Entrepreneur i's (expected) payo is
























k at ! = [!1;:::;!I]:
Insurance: Risk-averse individual i has total wealth W: Let U() be his
Bernoulli utility function for money. An accident occurs with probability
1   !i: The accident entails a monetary loss L: Individual i pays insurance
premium m
j
i to insurance company j and is reimbursed x
j
i in the case of the
accident. The individual's expected utility is !iU(W  mi)+(1 !i)U(W  






i): The prot for insur-

















k at ! = [!1;:::;!I]:
Trading: Each seller i produces a good. Let x
j
i be the quantity of the
good sold to buyer j (rm) and  m
j
i be the monetary payment made by
8buyer j: The quality of the good produced by seller i is his own private
information and is denoted by !i: The cost of producing xi units of the good
to seller i is c(xi;!i) so that seller i's payo is u(xi;mi;!i) =  mi c(xi;!i):









vj(xj;mj;!) at ! = [!1;:::;!I]:
We consider a market for non-exclusive trading in which rms may freely
oer agents any trading mechanisms that they want. Firms do not observe
trading mechanisms oered by competing rms. An alternative interpreta-
tion is that rms do observe competing rms' trading mechanisms but they
cannot write binding contracts directly contingent on competing rms' oers
that they observe. However, rms can make their terms of trade for an agent
contingent on all agents' reports in their trading mechanism. Messages are
private in the sense that the message that agent i sends to rm j are observ-
able only between them. This is consistent with the formulation in Epstein
and Peters (1999) and Yamashita (2010).
A rm's trading mechanism determines the quantity and payment pair
for each agent contingent on all agents' messages. For each rm j; let C be
the set of messages available for each agent i. Because agents are ex ante
anonymous, the rm oers an anonymous trading mechanism. Given rm




 i) 2 X  R denotes the
quantity and payment pair for each agent i when his message is c
j
i and the
other agents' messages are c
j
 i. For notational simplicity, let C include the
null message ?. We assume that if an agent decides not to participate in
rm j's trading mechanism, it is equivalent to sending the null message ? to
rm j. Let j(C;c
j
 i) denote the set of all quantity and monetary payment
pairs that each agent i can induce by sending messages in C when the other
agents' messages are c
j
 i.
Let  j be the set of all feasible trading mechanisms for each rm j. Let
   J
k=1 k: A competing mechanism game relative to   starts when each
rm j simultaneously oers a trading mechanism from  j: After observing a
prole of trading mechanisms, each agent sends messages, one to each rm.
Each rm j decides quantity and monetary payment pairs, one for each agent,
contingent on the messages that it receives from agents. A trading mechanism
can be very complex because the set of messages in a trading mechanism
can be quite general in the degree and nature of the communication that
it permits regarding what the other rms are doing: It could ask the agent
to report not only about his type but also about the whole set of trading
9mechanisms oered by the other rms, the terms of trade that the agent
chooses from the other rms, and so on. We adopt the notion of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium for the solution concept of the competing mechanism
game relative to  .
4 Collusion through Trading Mechanisms
Now we examine how rms can maintain their implicit collusion on terms of
trade. The market terms of trade can be characterized by a price schedule
y: X ! R that species the agent's payment to a rm as a function of the
quantity that the agent trades with it. Let Y be the set of all feasible price
schedules such that for all y 2 Y, (i) y(x)x > 0 if x 6= 0 and (ii) y(x) = 0
if x = 0:
Suppose that rms implicitly agree that they will trade with agents ac-
cording to a price schedule ~ y. If the agent can trade with each rm accord-
ing to the price schedule ~ y, the agent's payo maximization problem can be
















Let (~ x1(!i);:::; ~ xJ(!i)) be a solution to problem (1). Then, the maximum
payo for agent i of type !i becomes












Let u(!i)  u(0;0;!i) be the reservation payo for the agent of type !i:
Because ~ y(x) = 0 for x = 0, we can assure that ~ U(!i)  u(!i) for all !i 2 
:
Given a price schedule for each agent, the expected payo for rm j can
be accordingly expressed as
V










where E[] is the expectation operator over ! = [!1;:::;!I]. Let vj
 
E[vj(0;:::;0;0;:::;0;!)] be the reservation prot for rm j when it does
not trade at all. The level of the rm's reservation prot depends on the
application we consider. If the rm is a (potential) trader who owns a good
10such as a car owner or an asset holder, then its reservation prot is its
payo associated with keeping the good. If the rm is a producer that can
make a production decision contingent on contracting with buyers, then its
reservation prot is simply the zero prot associated with producing nothing.
We now examine how rms can implicitly support any price schedule ~ y
with V j(~ y)  vj
 for all j, as their equilibrium terms of trade. To this end, we
rst construct each rm's equilibrium trading mechanism that prevents any
rm's deviation to any complex trading mechanism. We call it a triggering
WICE direct mechanism.
For an arbitrary price schedule ~ y with V j(~ y)  vj
 for all j, each rm j's
triggering WICE direct mechanism is denoted by 
j
E: EI ! X R. The set
of messages available for each agent i is E  P  X; where P = R++ [ fg.
Each agent i reports (p;x) 2 E.4 The message x 2 X is the quantity that
the agent wants to trade with the rm. The message p has the following
meaning. If p = , then it means either (i) no other rms deviate from the
triggering WICE direct mechanisms or (ii) a deviating rm's price schedule
for each agent is ~ y and it is independent of the other agent's messages to
the deviating rm. If p 2 R++, then it means (a) there exists a deviating
rm whose trading mechanism does not induce (ii) and (b) p is the the
deviating rms' lowest average price for the agent if he was the only agent
who participated in the deviating rm's mechanism.
Suppose that rm k deviates to a mechanism k: CI ! XR: When each
agent i is the only agent who participates in the deviating rm's mechanism,








for (x;m) 2 
k(C;?
I 1) and x 6= 0
o
:
For an arbitrary price schedule ~ y with V j(~ y)  vj
 for all j, the triggering
WICE direct mechanism ~ 
j
E: EI ! X  R has the following properties:
D1. If the number of participating agents is two or more and more than half
of participating agents report p 2 R++, the rm oers a linear price
schedule (p) such that (p)(x) = ax for all x 2 X. Each participating
agent i then pays (y)(x) = ax for the quantity x that he submits
along with his report on some other rm's lowest average price.
4If an agent decides not to trade with a rm, it is assumed to be equivalent to sending
x = 0 to the rm. Accordingly the mechanism assigns zero monetary payment for the
agent.
11D2. In all other cases, the price schedule is ~ y. Each agent i then pays ~ y(x)
for the quantity x that he submits along with his report on some other
rm's price schedule.
The key to the triggering WICE direct mechanism is to set up (p) for all
p 2 R++ in a way that it induces agents not to trade with a deviating rm in
truth-telling continuation equilibrium. As shown later, non-deviating rms'
triggering WICE direct mechanisms in fact lead to truth-telling continuation
equilibrium in which each agent reports, to each non-deviating rm, the
lowest average price p that he believes he would face from the deviating
rm if he was the only one who participated in the deviating rm's trading
mechanism.
Suppose that a deviating rm's price schedule is p 2 R++ for each agent if
he was the only one who traded with the deviating rm. When two or more
agents participate in the non-deviating rm's triggering WICE direct mecha-
nism and more than half of participating agents report p 2 R++, then the trig-
















is the lowest average price based on the price
schedule ~ y.
Consider an arbitrary ~ y that induces V j(~ y)  vj
 for all j. Our main re-
sult shows that when every rm oers the triggering WICE direct mechanism
with () that satises (2) for any p 2 R++, there exists the truth-telling con-
tinuation equilibrium in which no rm j can make more prot than V j(~ y) by
deviating to any complex trading mechanism. Therefore, any price schedule
~ y with V j(~ y)  vj
 for all j can be supported as equilibrium terms of trade
in the market.
Theorem 1 Suppose that each rm oers the triggering WICE direct mech-
anism associated with a price schedule ~ y with V j(~ y)  vj
 for all j: It is the
equilibrium mechanism for each rm in perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
the truth-telling continuation equilibrium is characterized as follows:
1. When no rm deviates or rm k deviates to a mechanism that induces
~ y to each agent regardless of the other agents' reports to rm k, each
12agent i of type !i sends the message (; ~ xj(!i)) to each non-deviating
rm j and a message, to rm k, which leads him to trade ~ xk(!i) at
~ y(~ xk(!i)) with rm k.
2. When rm k deviates to any other mechanism, each agent i of type !i
trades ^ x(!i) only with every non-deviating rm by reporting (p; ^ x(!i));
where p is each agent's belief on the lowest average price that the devi-
ating rm's mechanism would induce if only one agent participated in
its mechanism and ^ x(!i) satises
^ x(!i) 2 argmax
x
u((J   1)x;(J   1)(p)(x);!i):
Proof. Choose an arbitrary price schedule ~ y that induces V j(~ y)  vj
 for
each rm j based on the solution (~ x1(!i);:::; ~ xj(!i)) to problem (1). Each
rm oers the triggering WICE direct mechanism associated with the price
schedule ~ y. We will show that the triggering WICE direct mechanism is the
equilibrium trading mechanism for each rm in perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which agents truthfully communicate with non-deviating rms on their
beliefs on the lowest average price that a deviating rm's trading mechanism
would induce no matter how complex the deviating rm's trading mechanism
is. First of all, consider the truth-telling continuation equilibrium on the
equilibrium path
(a) On the equilibrium path: When no rm deviates from its trigger-
ing WICE direct mechanism, each agent i participates in all rms' triggering
WICE direct mechanisms by sending the message (; ~ xj(!i)) to each rm
j. Suppose that an agent considers a deviation from the report  when he
communicates with a rm. Because of condition (D2), an agent cannot uni-
laterally change a rm's price schedule away from ~ y with any other report in
P given that all the other agents send  to the rm. Therefore, it is incen-
tive compatible for each agent to send  to each rm when the other agents
also send  to each rm. Because each rm's price schedule becomes ~ y, it
is in fact optimal for each buyer i of type !i to participate in each rm j's
triggering WICE direct mechanisms by sending ~ xj(!i) along with :
(b) O the equilibrium path: Now we consider rm k's deviation to
any complex trading mechanism. There are two types of deviation.
(b-1) Suppose that rm k deviates to a trading mechanism k: CI !
X  R such that (i) for all ck














13and (ii) for each x 2 X;
minfm 2 R: (x;m) 2 
k(C;c
k
 i)g = ~ y(x): (4)
(3) implies that the quantity and payment pair for each agent i depends only
on his message but not on the other agents' messages. For any ck
 i 2 CI 1;
recall that k(C;ck
 i) denotes the set of all quantity and payment pairs that
each agent i can induce from rm k:
When agent i chooses to trade x with rm k; there may be many messages
that can induce the same quantity x along with dierent amounts of payment.
If agent i ever chooses to trade x with rm k; it is always optimal for him to
trade x at the minimum payment. Therefore, the left-hand side of (4) is the
minimum payment that the agent will pay if he trades x with rm k. Note
that (4) already presumes that rm k deviates to a mechanism in which the
minimum on the left-hand side of (4) exists. In fact, when rm k deviates
to a mechanism satisfying (3) and (4), it is equivalent to oering the price
schedule ~ y.
Assume that, given rm k's deviation to a mechanism satisfying (3) and
(4), each agent i trades with all rms including the deviating rm. Each
agent i of type !i sends the message (; ~ xj(!i)) to each non-deviating rm j
and sends a message to rm k in a way that it induces him to trade ~ xk(!i)
with rm k at ~ y(~ xk(!i)): As proved in part (a), each agent nds it optimal to
send  to each non-deviating rm when all the other agents send the message
 to each non-deviating rm. This leads each non-deviating rm to assign
the price schedule ~ y given its triggering WICE direct mechanism. Because
all rms' price schedules, including the deviating rm's, are ~ y, it is again
optimal for each agent i of type !i to trade ~ x`(!i) with rm ` at ~ y(~ x`(!i))
for all ` = 1;:::;J: Parts (a) and (b-1) complete the proof of the rst part
of Theorem 1.
(b-2) Suppose that rm k deviates to any other trading mechanism
k: CI ! X  R that does not belong to (b-1). Suppose that agent i is
the only one agent who participates in rm k's trading mechanism. Then,
k(C;?I 1) is the set of all quantity and payment pairs that agent i can








for (x;m) 2 
k(C;?
I 1) and x 6= 0
o
: (5)
We will show that, upon rm k's deviation to a trading mechanism k :
CI ! X R, each agent i of type !i trades with only non-deviating rms by
14sending the message (p; ^ x(!i)) to each non-deviating rm, where p satises
(5) and ^ x(!i) 2 argmaxx u((J   1)x;(J   1)(y)(x);!i):
When every agent reports p 2 R++ to each non-deviating rm, the non-
deviating rm's price schedule becomes (p) according to (D1) so that the
agent pays (p)(x) = ax for any x that the agent trades with the non-
deviating rm. We rst show that it is optimal for each agent to truthfully
report p dened in (5) to each non-deviating rm when the other agents do
the same.
Assume that all agents truthfully report p dened in (5) to each non-
deviating rm upon rm k's deviation to k: CI ! X R. Suppose that an
agent reports p00 (p00 6= p) to any non-deviating rm given that all other agents
report p. If I  3; then the non-deviating rm's price schedule is still (p)
according to (D1) because still more than half of participating agents report
p. Therefore, the agent has no incentive to deviate away from p. If I = 2;
then the non-deviating rm's price schedule becomes ~ y according to (D2)
because one agent reports p and the other agent reports p00. Subsequently,
the agent pays ~ y(x) for any x that the agent trades with the non-deviating
rm. Because of (2), (p) satises (p)(x) = ax  ~ y(x) for any x: Hence
even when I = 2; it is optimal for an agent to truthfully report p to each
non-deviating rm given that the other agent does the same.
Finally we will show that it is optimal for each agent to trade ^ x(!i) only
with each non-deviating rm. Suppose that agent i currently trades x with
a non-deviating rm given that all agents report p to the non-deviating rm
and that he is the only agent who trades with the deviating rm. Let x0
be the quantity that agent i trades with the deviating rm. Then, the total
payment associated with trading x with the non-deviating seller and x0 with
the deviating seller is no less than ax + px0 because of the denition of (p)
in (2) and the denition of p in (5). However, if the agent trades x+x0 only
with the non-deviating seller, the monetary payment is a(x + x0), which is
no more than ax + px0 because of (2). It implies that the agent can trade
x + x0 with the same or less amount of monetary payment when he trades
only with the non-deviating rm. Therefore, it is optimal for each agent
not to trade with the deviating rm when all the other agents do not trade
with the deviating rm. Because each non-deviating rm's price schedule is
the linear price schedule (p); each agent i of type !i optimally trades the
equal quantity with each non-deviating rm by sending (p; ^ x(!i)) to it. This
completes the proof of the second part of Theorem 1.
When rm k deviates to a trading mechanism that belongs to (b-1), it
15receives the same expected prot V k(~ y) that it would receive with the trigger-
ing WICE direct mechanism. When rm k deviates to any other mechanism,
i.e., one that belongs to (b-2), it receives its reservation prot vj
 because
no agents trade with rm k in truthful continuation equilibrium. Because
the expected prot V k(~ y) associated with the triggering WICE direct mech-
anism is no less than vj
, rm k cannot gain by deviating to any alternative
mechanism.
When all rms maintain their triggering WICE direct mechanisms, their
price schedules are ~ y in truth-telling continuation equilibrium. When a rm
deviates to an arbitrary mechanism that is essentially equivalent to oering
~ y to each agent independent of the other agents' messages, non-deviating
rms do not punish the deviating rm and their price schedules continue
to be ~ y in truth-telling continuation equilibrium. If a rm deviates to any
other mechanism, then each agent reports, to each non-deviating rm, the
lowest average price p that the deviating rm's mechanism could induce
if he participated in the deviating rm's trading mechanism alone in truth-
telling continuation equilibrium. Subsequently, each non-deviating rm oers
a linear price schedule that has the unit price equal to the minimum between
the average unit price of ~ y and p. This makes it optimal for agents not to
trade with the deviating rm. Therefore, no rm j can nd a protable
deviation to any trading mechanism as long as the rm's expected prot
V j(~ y) associated with a price schedule ~ y is no less than vj
.
When there are three or more agents, an agent's unilateral deviation in his
report to a non-deviating rm does not chnage the non-deviating rm's price
schedule because still more than half of agents report the true lowest average
price that would be induced by a deviating rm's mechanism. When there are
only two agents, the WICE triggering mechanism shoots both agents upon
their dierent reports by continuing to assign ~ y for both agents. In this
way, the WICE triggering mechanism can induce truth-telling continuation
equilibrium as long as there are multiple agents.5
5As in the single principal case, an equilibrium in a competing mechanism game is
derived by the truth-telling continuation equilibrium in which agents truthfully reports
on what principals ask. To examine robustness of equilibrium, Han (2007) and Peters
(2001) study the notion of the strongly robust equilibrium. An equilibrium is said to be
strongly robust if it survives in all continuation equilibria upon any rm's deviation. Attar,
Mariotti, and Salani e (2011) pointed out that strongly robustness is too demanding and
especially it is inconsistent with equilibrium in the market for lemons (i.e., the common-
value case).
16The triggering WICE direct mechanism features convenience in a large
class of applications for non-exclusive trading problems under adverse selec-
tion. Each agent's message is two numbers (the deviating principal's lowest
average price and the quantity that the agent wants to buy) and hence it
is simple and independent of the number of agents. Therefore, each agent's
communication with a rm is very simple. The triggering WICE direct mech-
anism also works for any multiple number of agents, including the case of two
agents, and the set of equilibrium payos is dened in terms of each rm's
reservation prot which is independent of trading mechanisms.
5 Conclusion
In terms of applications, we can show how our results on multiple equilibria
dier from the multiplicity of equilibria in Akerlof (1970). According to
Akerlof's result, the Walrasian market price reects only the average quality
of the good and we may have multiple xed-point Walrasian prices that lead
to dierent average quality of the good traded in the market. Because the
Walrasian market price correctly reects the average quality of the good,
equilibrium prots are zero in any equilibrium. Our results dier from those
in Akerlof for the following reasons. First of all, we showed that rms can
maintain a wide range of collusive outcomes through the sophisticated trading
mechanisms that make rms' terms of trade responsive to agents' report on
competing rms' lowest average price. Subsequently, positive equilibrium
prots and corresponding prices may arise given the same probabilistic beliefs
on the quality of a good. Secondly, our multiplicity of equilibrium prots and
prices is based on the full game-theoretical approach without contractual
restrictions.
Theorem 1 can be easily extended to ex-ante heterogeneous agents. Let
ui(;;!i) is the payo function for agent i of type !i: Assume that rms agree
to oer an array of price schedules [~ y1;:::;~ yI] for agents, where yi is for agent
i: Given the price schedule ~ yi, we can nd a prole of quantities that agent
i of type !i will trade with each rm j. Given an array of price schedules
[~ y1;:::;~ yI], one can construct the triggering WICE direct mechanism for
each rm j that asks each agent to report a quantity that he wants to trade
and an array of the lowest average prices [p1;:::;pI], where pi is the lowest
average price that agent i would face if he was the only one who participated
in a deviating rm's trading mechanism.
17Consider the case in which the number of participating agents is two or
more, and more than half of their reports on some other rm's lowest average
prices, one for each agent i; are all [p1;:::;pI] and pi 6=  for some i. The
triggering WICE direct mechanism then assigns the price schedule i(pi) for








all other cases, the triggering WICE direct mechanism continues to assign
~ yi for each agent i. Given this triggering WICE direct mechanism, we can
show that Theorem 1 is extended for ex-ante heterogeneous agents.
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